Effective affirmative action in school choice
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Publication:4585977
Recommendations
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Affirmative action and school choice
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
Cited in
(80)- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Matching with contracts, substitutes and two-unit demand
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- On lexicographic choice
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets
- Graduate admission with financial support
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Constrained random matching
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Matching through institutions
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice
- Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Menu mechanisms
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Affirmative action algorithms
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Affirmative action and school choice
- Improving the Chilean college admissions system
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Stable matching with proportionality constraints
- Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
- Market Design
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS
- Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves
- Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions
- Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
- Transparent matching mechanisms
- Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?
- Market design with distributional objectives: efficiency, incentives, and property rights
- Quota implementation in assignment games
- Gradual matching with affirmative action
- Market design with deferred acceptance: a recipe for characterizations
- Meritocracy versus diversity
- Efficient and strategy-proof mechanism under general constraints
- The complexity of finding fair many-to-one matchings
- Matching with transfers under distributional constraints
- Widening access in university admissions
- Optimal top-n policy
- A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules
- Equal treatment and its market design implications
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
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