Effective affirmative action in school choice
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Publication:4585977
DOI10.3982/TE1135zbMath1395.91344WikidataQ57990807 ScholiaQ57990807MaRDI QIDQ4585977
M. Bumin Yenmez, Isa E. Hafalir, Muhammed A. Yildirim
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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