Recommendations
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
Cited in
(9)- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- Affirmative action algorithms
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice
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