Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.03.009zbMATH Open1476.91099OpenAlexW2926312334WikidataQ128163564 ScholiaQ128163564MaRDI QIDQ2294296FDOQ2294296
Authors: Yajing Chen, Ziyang Shen, Guoqiang Tian, Zhenhua Jiao 
Publication date: 10 February 2020
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.009
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top trading cycles mechanismaffirmative actionschool choiceminimal responsivenesscommon school priority within type
Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Constrained school choice
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Cited In (13)
- Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Affirmative action and school choice
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
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