Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.03.009MaRDI QIDQ2294296zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yajing Chen, Ziyang Shen, Guoqiang Tian, Zhenhua Jiao

Publication date 10 February 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

top trading cycles mechanismaffirmative actionschool choiceminimal responsivenesscommon school priority within type

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
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• Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
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Cites work

• Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice
• Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
• Competitive equilibria in school assignment
• Constrained school choice
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• On cores and indivisibility
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles

Cited in

(13)

• Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
• Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations
• Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice
• The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
• On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
• Affirmative action and school choice
• A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice
• When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
• Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study

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