Two simple variations of top trading cycles
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Publication:496872
DOI10.1007/S00199-014-0820-4zbMATH Open1367.91145OpenAlexW1990827958WikidataQ57436378 ScholiaQ57436378MaRDI QIDQ496872FDOQ496872
Authors: Thayer Morrill 
Publication date: 22 September 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4
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- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Making just school assignments
Cited In (20)
- Top trading cycles
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- The cutoff structure of top trading cycles in school choice
- Capacity design in school choice
- Making just school assignments
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Mutually best matches
- The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
- Sticky matching in school choice
- What you don't know can help you in school assignment
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- School choice with farsighted students
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
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