Two simple variations of top trading cycles
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Publication:496872
DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4zbMath1367.91145WikidataQ57436378 ScholiaQ57436378MaRDI QIDQ496872
Publication date: 22 September 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4
91B68: Matching models
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