On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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- School Choice with Consent*
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
Cited in
(26)- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Manipulation via capacities revisited
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Capacity design in school choice
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Manipulability in school choice
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
- Sticky matching in school choice
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
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