Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0703-1MaRDI QIDQ2453419zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3715948

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Manipulation via capacities revisited
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets
• On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results

Cited in

(12)

• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Capacity allocation games without an initial sequence
• Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
• Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
• Analysis of a simple capacity game
• Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
• Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
• Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket

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