Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
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Publication:2453419
DOI10.1007/s00355-012-0703-1zbMath1288.91154OpenAlexW3125428316MaRDI QIDQ2453419
Matteo Triossi, Antonio Romero-Medina
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3715948
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