Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
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Recommendations
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
Cited in
(5)- Single-crossing choice correspondences
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
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