On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1583164
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00263-9zbMath0960.91052MaRDI QIDQ1583164
Publication date: 26 October 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
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