Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
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Publication:2452248
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0659-1zbMATH Open1288.91017OpenAlexW3122542724MaRDI QIDQ2452248FDOQ2452248
Emiliya A. Lazarova, Dinko Dimitrov
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96838/files/NDL2010-122.pdf
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Cites Work
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