Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90034-PMaRDI QIDQ1195599zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mamoru Kaneko, Toshiyuki Kimura

Publication date 12 January 1993

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90034-P

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites work

• Dynamic models of segregation†
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3342731 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• The conventionally stable sets in non-cooperative games with limited observations. I: Definitions and introductory arguments

Cited in

(6)

• On the existence of a stable convention and a generalized Stackelberg equilibrium
• Strategic behavior and the persistence of discrimination in professional baseball
• Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
• Discrimination in festival games with limited observability and accessibility
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• `NEXT' events: a cooperative game theoretic view to festivals

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