Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00678.xzbMath1127.91047OpenAlexW2030597104MaRDI QIDQ3410708

Alp E. Atakan

Publication date: 30 November 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00678.x

zbMATH Keywords

supermodularityassignmenttransferable utilitysearch frictionsassortative matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

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