A college admissions clearinghouse
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Publication:1757598
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.010zbMath1419.91540OpenAlexW2803995838MaRDI QIDQ1757598
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.010
path independencemany-to-many matchinglaw of aggregate demandcollege admissionsmodificationsubstitutability
Related Items
Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets, Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions, Strategic disaggregation in matching markets, Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching, A college admissions clearinghouse, Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
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