Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets
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Publication:6107369
DOI10.1007/s00199-022-01417-5zbMath1520.91226OpenAlexW3121571974MaRDI QIDQ6107369
Antonio Romero-Medina, Matteo Triossi
Publication date: 3 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/24368
Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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Cites Work
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