Implementation of college admission rules
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Publication:1357430
DOI10.1007/s001990050121zbMath0872.90006OpenAlexW4248484588MaRDI QIDQ1357430
Publication date: 1997
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/46115
two-sided matchingstrong Nash implementationmatching rulescollege admissions problemspublic decision problems
Related Items (28)
On combining implementable social choice rules ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems ⋮ An impossibility theorem for matching problems ⋮ Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability ⋮ Weak implementation ⋮ Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
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