Implementation of college admission rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1357430
DOI10.1007/s001990050121zbMath0872.90006MaRDI QIDQ1357430
Publication date: 1997
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/46115
two-sided matching; strong Nash implementation; matching rules; college admissions problems; public decision problems
91B14: Social choice
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