Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1021616
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.019zbMath1161.91428OpenAlexW3124275701MaRDI QIDQ1021616
Publication date: 8 June 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10533/130650
Lua error in Module:PublicationMSCList at line 37: attempt to index local 'msc_result' (a nil value).
Related Items (5)
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
