The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
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Publication:2675461
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Cites work
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Cited in
(11)- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Delayed Acceptance ABC-SMC
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
- Generalized cumulative offer processes
- Incomplete information, self-confidence, and positive sorting
- An experimental study on strategic preference formation in two-sided matching markets
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