The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
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Publication:2675461
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.07.001zbMATH Open1498.91277OpenAlexW3125134700MaRDI QIDQ2675461FDOQ2675461
Authors: Inácio Bó, Rustamdjan Hakimov 
Publication date: 23 September 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.001
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Cites Work
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Cited In (9)
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Delayed Acceptance ABC-SMC
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Generalized cumulative offer processes
- Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem
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