School choice: an experimental study
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2491034
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006zbMath1122.91054OpenAlexW2155875411MaRDI QIDQ2491034
Publication date: 18 May 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006
Related Items
Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms, Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof, Constrained school choice, Matching in the large: an experimental study, Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match, Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation, An analysis of the German university admissions system, When preference misreporting is harm[lessful?], Affirmative action through minority reserves: an experimental study on school choice, Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse, Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning, Parallel markets in school choice, Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study, Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak, The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism, Strategic behavior in regressions: an experimental study, Distance on matchings: An axiomatic approach, Matching markets under (in)complete information, Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis, Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms, Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf, CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS, Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values, Mediated talk: an experiment, Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism, A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231], Corrigendum to ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231], Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study, Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions, Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China, Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis, The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach, High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis, An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism, Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study, Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment, The instability of matching with overconfident agents, Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies, Market Design, The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions, School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms, Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation, Cognitive ability and games of school choice, The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment, Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design, College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized, On recombinant estimation for experimental data, Self-selection in school choice, Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare, Level-k reasoning in school choice, Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance, Monotone strategyproofness, Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment, How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field, Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab, Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism, The modified Boston mechanism, Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice, Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism, Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
- On cores and indivisibility
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
