Cognitive ability and games of school choice

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.011zbMath1390.91089OpenAlexW3125248235MaRDI QIDQ1753282

Marco Mantovani, Christian Basteck

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.011

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessmechanism designschool choicelaboratory experimentcognitive ability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ Parallel markets in school choice ⋮ Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms ⋮ Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism ⋮ A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Level-k reasoning in school choice ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance ⋮ How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
• The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• School choice: an experimental study
• Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism

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