Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
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Cites work
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Cited in
(31)- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
- Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information
- Parallel markets in school choice
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
- Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
- Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
- Obvious manipulations
- Procedural information as a ``game changer in school choice
- Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Random assignments and outside options
- Rankings-dependent preferences: a real goods matching experiment
- Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Ordinal simplicity in discrete mechanism design
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
- An experimental study of decentralized matching
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
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