Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
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Publication:2105701
DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00446-YzbMATH Open1505.91260OpenAlexW4224302850MaRDI QIDQ2105701FDOQ2105701
Authors: Ethem Akyol 
Publication date: 8 December 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00446-y
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incomplete informationBoston mechanismschool choiceex-ante welfareBayesian incentive compatibilitydeferred acceptance mechanism
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- School choice: an experimental study
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- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
Cited In (4)
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
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