What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105120MaRDI QIDQ2220932zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad

Publication date 25 January 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120

zbMATH Keywords

market designmatchingschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• An Exact Analysis of Stable Allocation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Counting Walks and Graph Homomorphisms via Markov Chains and Importance Sampling
• Discrete probability models and methods. Probability on graphs and trees, Markov chains and random fields, entropy and coding
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 627762 (Why is no real title available?)
• Lotteries in student assignment: an equivalence result
• Marriage, honesty, and stability
• On cores and indivisibility
• On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
• On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal Numbers of Men and Women
• Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• The Average Number of Stable Matchings

Cited in

(12)

• How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
• Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
• Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules
• The superintendent's dilemma: managing school district capacity as parents vote with their feet
• Allocation with weak priorities and general constraints
• Breaking ties: regression discontinuity design meets market design
• Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
• Common enrollment in school choice
• On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules
• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
• Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?

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