On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules

DOI10.3982/TE4762MaRDI QIDQ6076906zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4762

zbMATH Keywords

matchingdeferred acceptancetiebreaking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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• Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds

Cited in

(2)

• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
• Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

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