On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
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Publication:6564052
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105842zbMATH Open1544.91161MaRDI QIDQ6564052FDOQ6564052
Authors: Xiang Han 
Publication date: 28 June 2024
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
random allocationschool choiceindivisible objectweak prioritydeferred acceptance with single tie-breakingex-post constrained efficiency
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