On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
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Publication:6564052
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
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- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
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