Efficient assignment respecting priorities
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Publication:972883
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.007zbMATH Open1245.91046OpenAlexW2032434317MaRDI QIDQ972883FDOQ972883
Publication date: 21 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
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- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Consistent house allocation
- School Choice with Consent*
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Efficient priority rules
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
Cited In (24)
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- A market design approach to job rotation
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Optimal priority assignment with hard constraint
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- School choice with preference rank classes
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
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