Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities

DOI10.3982/TE2547MaRDI QIDQ4612461zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Alexander Westkamp

Publication date 31 January 2019

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te2547

zbMATH Keywords

constrained efficiencystabilitystrategy-proofnessweak priorities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities
• Efficient priority rules

Cites work

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• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(9)

• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• A market design approach to job rotation
• School choice with preference rank classes
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
• On two mechanisms in job rotation problems
• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
• On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
• Tâtonnement in matching markets

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