The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

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Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
A further note on the stable matching problem
Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem
Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
Implementation in generalized matching problems
Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
A simple selling and buying procedure
Analysis of ground state in random bipartite matching
Instability in stable marriage problem: matching unequally numbered men and women
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
Matching in the large: an experimental study
Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
Towards a fair distribution mechanism for asylum
Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers
Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
Epsilon-stability in school choice
Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
School choice with vouchers
Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
Stable matchings and preferences of couples
Self-organizing teams
Protective behavior in matching models
Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
The roommates problem revisited
Cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm with complete preference lists
Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets
School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution
Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking
Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches
Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
College admissions with tuition transfers
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
Bipartite choices
Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets
Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences
Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event
Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
Matching through institutions
Non-monetary coordination mechanisms for time slot allocation in warehouse delivery
Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
Obvious manipulations
Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach
An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference
Synchronized matching with incomplete information
Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
Incentives in landing slot problems
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
ReGale: some memorable results
Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
Two-sided matching with indifferences

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