Synchronized matching with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1127-7MaRDI QIDQ2323604zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Terence R. Johnson

Publication date 3 September 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1127-7

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmechanism designnon-transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information

Cites work

• Aggregating the single crossing property
• Assortative Matching and Search
• Coarse Matching
• Game theory
• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• Large contests
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• Matching through position auctions
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(2)

• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

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