Synchronized matching with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-018-1127-7zbMATH Open1422.91553OpenAlexW2803535636MaRDI QIDQ2323604FDOQ2323604

Authors: Terence R. Johnson 

Publication date: 3 September 2019

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1127-7

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zbMATH Keywords

matchingmechanism designnon-transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Assortative Matching and Search
• Many-to-many matching and price discrimination
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Matching through position auctions
• Aggregating the single crossing property
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Coarse Matching
• Large contests
• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

Cited In (2)

• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

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