Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105054MaRDI QIDQ785531zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Naomi Utgoff

Publication date 7 August 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105054

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmarket designmechanism designauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Synchronized matching with incomplete information
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Matching through position auctions
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

Cites work

• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Matching through position auctions
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Optimal Auction Design
• Price discrimination and efficient matching
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(6)

• Synchronized matching with incomplete information
• Informational hold up and intermediaries
• Truthtelling in matching markets
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

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