Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
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Recommendations
Cites work
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Matching through position auctions
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Optimal Auction Design
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
Cited in
(6)- Synchronized matching with incomplete information
- Informational hold up and intermediaries
- Truthtelling in matching markets
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
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