Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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Publication:4530948
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00044zbMath1021.91036OpenAlexW2158369566MaRDI QIDQ4530948
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00044
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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