Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001zbMath1132.91579OpenAlexW2120832476MaRDI QIDQ2496782

M. Utku Ünver, Hideo Konishi

Publication date: 20 July 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp570.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriummany-to-many matchingpairwise stabilitygroup stabilitycredible deviation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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