Two-sided coalitional matchings
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Publication:554501
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2011.03.005zbMATH Open1232.91082OpenAlexW2088603990MaRDI QIDQ554501FDOQ554501
Emiliya A. Lazarova, Dinko Dimitrov
Publication date: 4 August 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.005
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Dynamic models of segregation†
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
- WORLDWIDE INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL RANKINGS IN ECONOMETRICS OVER THE PERIOD 1989–1999: AN UPDATE
Cited In (4)
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