Two-sided coalitional matchings

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.005zbMath1232.91082OpenAlexW2088603990MaRDI QIDQ554501

Dinko Dimitrov, Emiliya A. Lazarova

Publication date: 4 August 2011

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

preferencescoalition matching problemcore stable partition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Dynamic models of segregation†
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• WORLDWIDE INSTITUTIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL RANKINGS IN ECONOMETRICS OVER THE PERIOD 1989–1999: AN UPDATE
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Two-sided coalitional matchings