Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
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(9)- The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Two-sided coalitional matchings
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
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