Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0206-1zbMATH Open1211.91182OpenAlexW1990955687MaRDI QIDQ532732FDOQ532732

Authors: Marilda Sotomayor 

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0206-1

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zbMATH Keywords

core allocationstable allocationdual allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• A note on the multiple partners assignment game

Cited In (5)

• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
• Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
• Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences

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