Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
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Publication:328575
DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0486-6zbMATH Open1388.91136OpenAlexW1411965481MaRDI QIDQ328575FDOQ328575
Authors: Marilda Sotomayor 
Publication date: 20 October 2016
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0486-6
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Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
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- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
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