Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- A discrete multivariate mean value theorem with applications
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- The core of an m-sided assignment game
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Buying several indivisible goods
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- Restricted housewapping games
- The law of supply in games, markets and matching models
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- On competitive equilibria with common complementarities.
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities.
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Application of M-convex submodular flow problem to mathematical economics
- An alternative proof of an equilibrium existence theorem in exchange economies with indivisibilities
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple indivisible commodities and money
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
- Independence systems in gross-substitute valuations
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- Competition in a posted-salary matching market under private information
- On the maximal domain theorem: a corrigendum to ``Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Gross substitutability: an algorithmic survey
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Constitutions and groups
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
- Antimatroids induced by matchings
- Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games
- Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions
- Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
- Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
- Simpler exchange axioms for M-concave functions on generalized polymatroids
- A stronger multiple exchange property for \(\mathrm{M}^{\natural }\)-concave functions
- Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
- Buyback problem with discrete concave valuation functions
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
- On complexity of single-minded auction
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security
- Exact bounds for steepest descent algorithms of $L$-convex function minimization
- On lexicographic choice
- A simple characterization of responsive choice
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets
- A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
- The package assignment model.
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- The stable roommates problem with choice functions
- A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
- Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems
- The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
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