Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

coalition formation job matching comparative statics gross substitutes existence of equilibrium adding agents to the market competitive adjustment processes labor markets with perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
Stable matching in large economies
Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers
Decentralized job matching

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
Decentralized college admissions under single application
Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
Counting combinatorial choice rules
Combinatorial integer labeling theorems on finite sets with applications
On the characterizations of viable proposals
Dynamic reserves in matching markets
A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Rationalizable choice functions
Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
Constitutions and groups
WARP and combinatorial choice
On lexicographic choice
A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
When are welfare guarantees robust?
The stable roommates problem with choice functions
Auctions of heterogeneous objects
Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
On the construction of substitutes
Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
Restricted housewapping games
Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
Paths to stability in the assignment problem
Substitution, complementarity, and stability
The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
Pricing multi-unit markets
Ascending price Vickrey auctions
On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
Influence in private-goods allocation
A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities
Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
A discrete multivariate mean value theorem with applications
Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
A further note on the college admission game
Labour market recruiting with intermediaries
Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
Absorbing sets in roommate problems
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
Matching with partially ordered contracts
An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
Market structure and matching with contracts
Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
Submodular functions: learnability, structure, and optimization
Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
Testing substitutability
A competitive partnership formation process
A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
A simple selling and buying procedure
The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Multilateral matching
A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
Verifiability and group formation in markets
Household formation and markets
Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
Two-sided matching with indifferences
Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

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