Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
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- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
- Buying several indivisible goods
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
- Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Core and competitive equilibria: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- On lattice and DA
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- Core-selecting package auctions
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Vacancies in supply chain networks
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
- Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
- A model of partnership formation
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Welfare and rationality guarantees for the simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- The package assignment model.
- Gross substitutes and complements: a simple generalization
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- A constant-factor approximation for generalized malleable scheduling under \(M^{\natural }\)-concave processing speeds
- Partitionable choice functions and stability
- Diverse organizations and the competition for talent
- On the expressiveness of assignment messages
- Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
- Equivalence between substitutability and \(\mathrm{M}^\natural\)-concavity for set functions under discrete transfers
- Tick size, price grids and market performance: stable matches as a model of market dynamics and equilibrium
- Matching with nonexclusive contracts
- High-welfare matching markets via descending price
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Properties of bundle valuations in carrier collaboration
- Local incentive compatibility on gross substitutes and other non-convex type-spaces
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Every finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to the minimizer set of an \(M^\natural \)-concave set function
- Ad exchange: envy-free auctions with mediators
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