Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
- Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
- On the characterizations of viable proposals
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- When are welfare guarantees robust?
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- A discrete multivariate mean value theorem with applications
- Substitution, complementarity, and stability
- On lexicographic choice
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
- Rationalizable choice functions
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- A further note on the college admission game
- Pricing multi-unit markets
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Constitutions and groups
- Labour market recruiting with intermediaries
- Restricted housewapping games
- On the construction of substitutes
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Combinatorial integer labeling theorems on finite sets with applications
- The stable roommates problem with choice functions
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
- Buying several indivisible goods
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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