Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes

DOI10.2307/1913392zbMATH Open0503.90019OpenAlexW2158486621WikidataQ29307898 ScholiaQ29307898MaRDI QIDQ3970126FDOQ3970126

Authors: Alexander S. Jun. Kelso, Vincent P. Crawford 

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6991ca1170f3efb723ead5424ab6638d110d858

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zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationjob matchingcomparative staticsgross substitutesexistence of equilibriumadding agents to the marketcompetitive adjustment processeslabor markets with perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Decentralized college admissions under single application
• Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
• On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
• Counting combinatorial choice rules
• On the Construction of Substitutes
• Combinatorial integer labeling theorems on finite sets with applications
• On the characterizations of viable proposals
• Dynamic reserves in matching markets
• A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
• Rationalizable choice functions
• Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
• Constitutions and groups
• WARP and combinatorial choice
• On lexicographic choice
• A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
• Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
• Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
• The stable roommates problem with choice functions
• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
• Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
• Restricted housewapping games
• Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
• Paths to stability in the assignment problem
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
• Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
• Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
• Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms
• Pricing multi-unit markets
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
• Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
• The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
• Influence in private-goods allocation
• A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
• Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
• Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities
• Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
• A discrete multivariate mean value theorem with applications
• Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
• A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
• Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust
• A further note on the college admission game
• Labour market recruiting with intermediaries
• Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
• A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
• Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
• Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
• Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
• Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
• Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
• Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
• Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
• The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
• Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
• Absorbing sets in roommate problems
• The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
• Matching with partially ordered contracts
• An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
• Market structure and matching with contracts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
• Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
• Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
• On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
• Testing substitutability
• A competitive partnership formation process
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
• Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
• A simple selling and buying procedure
• The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
• Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
• Multilateral matching
• A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Verifiability and group formation in markets
• Household formation and markets
• Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
• Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices

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