Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
DOI10.2307/1913392zbMATH Open0503.90019OpenAlexW2158486621WikidataQ29307898 ScholiaQ29307898MaRDI QIDQ3970126FDOQ3970126
Authors: Alexander S. Jun. Kelso, Vincent P. Crawford 
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6991ca1170f3efb723ead5424ab6638d110d858
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coalition formationjob matchingcomparative staticsgross substitutesexistence of equilibriumadding agents to the marketcompetitive adjustment processeslabor markets with perfect information
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- On Lattice and DA
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Welfare and rationality guarantees for the simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Vacancies in supply chain networks
- Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
- Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Quantile stable mechanisms
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- Buying several indivisible goods
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Gross substitutes and complements: a simple generalization
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- The package assignment model.
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Core and competitive equilibria: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- A model of partnership formation
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
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