Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
DOI10.2307/1913392zbMATH Open0503.90019OpenAlexW2158486621WikidataQ29307898 ScholiaQ29307898MaRDI QIDQ3970126FDOQ3970126
Authors: Alexander S. Jun. Kelso, Vincent P. Crawford 
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6991ca1170f3efb723ead5424ab6638d110d858
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coalition formationjob matchingcomparative staticsgross substitutesexistence of equilibriumadding agents to the marketcompetitive adjustment processeslabor markets with perfect information
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Submodular functions: learnability, structure, and optimization
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- A competitive partnership formation process
- A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
- Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Multilateral matching
- A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Household formation and markets
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- On complexity of single-minded auction
- Choice functions on posets
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Decentralized job matching
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
- Valuated matroid-based algorithm for submodular welfare problem
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions
- A note on job matching with budget constraints
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Cheap labor can be expensive
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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