Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Valuated matroid-based algorithm for submodular welfare problem
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Decentralized job matching
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Household formation and markets
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- A competitive partnership formation process
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- Multilateral matching
- A note on job matching with budget constraints
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Submodular functions: learnability, structure, and optimization
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Cheap labor can be expensive
- A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- On complexity of single-minded auction
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Choice functions on posets
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
- Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm
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