Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
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- On stable assignments generated by choice functions of mixed type
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- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
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- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
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- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- Restricted housewapping games
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- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7765397 (Why is no real title available?)
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- On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules
- The finite matroid-based valuation conjecture is false
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