Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
- Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
- On the characterizations of viable proposals
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- When are welfare guarantees robust?
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- A discrete multivariate mean value theorem with applications
- Substitution, complementarity, and stability
- On lexicographic choice
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
- Rationalizable choice functions
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- A further note on the college admission game
- Pricing multi-unit markets
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Constitutions and groups
- Labour market recruiting with intermediaries
- Restricted housewapping games
- On the construction of substitutes
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Combinatorial integer labeling theorems on finite sets with applications
- The stable roommates problem with choice functions
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
- Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Valuated matroid-based algorithm for submodular welfare problem
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Decentralized job matching
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
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