Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Valuated matroid-based algorithm for submodular welfare problem
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Decentralized job matching
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204414 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Household formation and markets
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- A competitive partnership formation process
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- Multilateral matching
- A note on job matching with budget constraints
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Submodular functions: learnability, structure, and optimization
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Cheap labor can be expensive
- A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- On complexity of single-minded auction
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Choice functions on posets
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
- Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
- On the characterizations of viable proposals
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- When are welfare guarantees robust?
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
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