Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
DOI10.2307/1913392zbMATH Open0503.90019OpenAlexW2158486621WikidataQ29307898 ScholiaQ29307898MaRDI QIDQ3970126FDOQ3970126
Authors: Alexander S. Jun. Kelso, Vincent P. Crawford 
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6991ca1170f3efb723ead5424ab6638d110d858
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coalition formationjob matchingcomparative staticsgross substitutesexistence of equilibriumadding agents to the marketcompetitive adjustment processeslabor markets with perfect information
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Combinatorial integer labeling theorems on finite sets with applications
- On the characterizations of viable proposals
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Rationalizable choice functions
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- Constitutions and groups
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- On lexicographic choice
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- When are welfare guarantees robust?
- The stable roommates problem with choice functions
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- On the construction of substitutes
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Restricted housewapping games
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Substitution, complementarity, and stability
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Existence and welfare properties of equilibrium in an exchange economy with multiple divisible and indivisible commodities and linear production technologies
- Networks, frictions, and price dispersion
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Pricing multi-unit markets
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
- Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods
- The Stable Roommates Problem with Choice Functions
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
- Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games
- Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple indivisible and multiple divisible commodities
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- A discrete multivariate mean value theorem with applications
- Existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with indivisibilities and money
- A Dual Approach for Dynamic Pricing in Multidemand Markets
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- A further note on the college admission game
- Labour market recruiting with intermediaries
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- A competitive market model for indivisible commodities.
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Simultaneous independent online auctions with discrete bid increments
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
- Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
- Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments nonemptiness and equal treatment
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
- Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Local matching dynamics in social networks
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Trading networks with price-setting agents
- Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Gross substitution, discrete convexity, and submodularity
- New characterizations of M-convex functions and their applications to economic equilibrium models with indivisibilities.
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Median stable matching for markets with wages
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- Welfare and rationality guarantees for the simultaneous multiple-round ascending auction
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
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