Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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Publication:3970126
DOI10.2307/1913392zbMATH Open0503.90019OpenAlexW2158486621WikidataQ29307898 ScholiaQ29307898MaRDI QIDQ3970126FDOQ3970126
Authors: Alexander S. Jun. Kelso, Vincent P. Crawford 
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e6991ca1170f3efb723ead5424ab6638d110d858
Recommendations
coalition formationjob matchingcomparative staticsgross substitutesexistence of equilibriumadding agents to the marketcompetitive adjustment processeslabor markets with perfect information
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Applications of discrete convex analysis to mathematical economics
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- Combinatorial Walrasian equilibrium
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Matching with partially ordered contracts
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process
- Submodular functions: learnability, structure, and optimization
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Testing substitutability
- A competitive partnership formation process
- A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem
- Approximation of Walrasian equilibrium in single-minded auctions
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
- Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
- Multilateral matching
- A foundation of location theory: existence of equilibrium, the welfare theorems, and core
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
- Verifiability and group formation in markets
- Household formation and markets
- Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
- Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- On complexity of single-minded auction
- Choice functions on posets
- Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Decentralized job matching
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings
- Valuated matroid-based algorithm for submodular welfare problem
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Stability and competitive equilibria in multi-unit trading networks with discrete concave utility functions
- A note on job matching with budget constraints
- Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Cheap labor can be expensive
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process
- Cumulative offer process is order-independent
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
- Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms
- Decentralized college admissions under single application
- Binary operations and lattice structure for a model of matching with contracts
- On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles
- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- Combinatorial integer labeling theorems on finite sets with applications
- On the characterizations of viable proposals
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
- Rationalizable choice functions
- Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note
- Constitutions and groups
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- On lexicographic choice
- A general two-sided matching market with discrete concave utility functions
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
- When are welfare guarantees robust?
- The stable roommates problem with choice functions
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- Walrasian equilibrium: Hardness, approximations and tractable instances
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- On the construction of substitutes
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Restricted housewapping games
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
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