Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
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Publication:3748090
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Cited in
(59)- Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
- ``Fair marriages: an impossibility
- Matching, search, and bargaining
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Walrasian equilibrium in matching models
- Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
- Multilateral bargaining problems
- Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets
- Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers.
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
- Non-cooperative matching games
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Bargaining, coalitions and competition
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Matching markets and cultural selection
- Gainers and losers from market integration
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
- Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
- Interpolating between matching and hedonic pricing models
- Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
- Households, markets and public choice
- Household formation and markets
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Matching through position auctions
- A decentralized model of information pricing in networks
- Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Disagreement in Markets with Matching and Bargaining
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592675 (Why is no real title available?)
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Decentralized matching markets of various sizes: similarly stable solutions with high proportions of equal splits
- Fractional matching markets
- Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
- Job matching and coalition formation with utility or disutility of co-workers
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents
- Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
- Groups, collective decisions and markets
- Exchange networks with stochastic matching
- Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
- Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints
- Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
- Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
- Matching for teams
- Hedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: Equivalence, topology, and uniqueness
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