The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
- The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- The core of the matching game
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities
- An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
- On Vickrey-type auction procedures
- Restricted housewapping games
- Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game.
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
- Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets
- Comparative statics of assignment markets with general utilities
- Non-cooperative matching games
- The package assignment model.
- Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
- An algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- A competitive partnership formation process
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
- Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
- The impact of strategic agents in two-sided markets
- Bipartite choices
- Decision-making with reference information
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- Comparative statics in markets for indivisible goods
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
- Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets
- Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
- Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication
- A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand
- Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
- Strategy-proofness and markets
- David in Paris
- ReGale: some memorable results
- My encounters with David Gale
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
- A graph theoretic approach to markets for indivisible goods
- Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Descending price multi-item auctions
- Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- The minimum set of \(\mu\)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
- Popular Matchings: Structure and Strategic Issues
- Competitive equilibria for non-quasilinear bidders in combinatorial auctions
- Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
- Quasi stable outcomes in the assignment game
- Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm
- When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for fair rent division
- The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: leading examples
- Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
- Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
- Stochastic overlapping generations with non-convex budget sets
- Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts
- Sensitivity of fair prices in assignment markets
- Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
- Solidarity to achieve stability
- An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
- Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
- Equilibria in matching markets with soft and hard liquidity constraints
- Strategic behavior in one-to-one matching markets without outside options
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
- Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money
- Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices
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