The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.007MaRDI QIDQ1735792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ryan Tierney

Publication date 29 March 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

indivisible goodsincentive-compatibilitycommonsmin-price equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Advances in mathematical economics. Vol. 6
• Evaluating assignment without transfers: a market perspective
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Non-manipulable house allocation with rent control
• On cores and indivisibility
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

Cited in

(6)

• The commons with capital markets
• The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies
• Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
• Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula
• Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
• Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons

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