Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3547015 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099361 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
- Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
- Incentives in Teams
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- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
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- On the generic impossibility of truthful behavior: A simple approach
- Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Topological methods in Walrasian economics
Cited in
(13)- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Comparing finite mechanisms
- Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
- The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
- The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
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