Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
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Publication:1601458
DOI10.1006/JETH.2000.2788zbMATH Open1010.91063OpenAlexW2126587558MaRDI QIDQ1601458FDOQ1601458
Authors: Alexander Kovalenkov 
Publication date: 20 May 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/479b0bd4661fa881b772b46ef156a0a1a715ab1e
Recommendations
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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Cited In (13)
- Comparing finite mechanisms
- Finite allocation mechanisms: approximate walrasian versus approximate direct revelation
- Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
- The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
- The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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