scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233
This study is concerned with the possibility of constructing mechanisms which lead to Pareto optimal outcomes and provide incentives for individuals to reveal their preferences correctly. The basic result of Part II is the characterization of the Clark-Groves mechanism. It is shown that when the economic environment is suitably restricted, this mechanism is satisfactory, i.e., there exists a dominant strategy (truth-telling) for every individual, and the outcome is Pareto optimal. Moreover, all satisfactory mechanisms inducing truthful strategies coincide with the set of Groves mechanisms. The authors explore the possibilities of extending this basic result to less restrictive environments. One severe restriction was the absence of income effects. A second possible extension is to stipulate that the outcome must be Pareto optimal for the actual N participants, ignoring the welfare of the outside agency, equivalently, the budget must balance. Thirdly one can study the possibility of designing mechanisms to avoid manipulation by coalitions. Unfortunately, in all cases, the results are negative. The authors also examine weaker incentive compatibility requirements: (i) individuals play their maximin strategies in a game in which there are no dominant strategies; (ii) individuals maximize expected utility, given their beliefs; (iii) Nash equilibria are realized in the game created by the mechanism. In all these cases, the results are positive. The book also gives several interesting results for large economies. When the population mean of the expected willingness to pay for the project is zero, then it is possible to close the system by redistributing any surplus without distorting the incentive properties of the Clark mechanism. A second result is that in large economies, coalitions' gain from cheating is less than the costs of collusion. Unfortunately, both the results are proved assuming no income effects. It is also shown that when the public project under consideration has a positive income effect for all agents, agents will generally understate their net willingness to pay for the project so that projects which should be implemented will be rejected. The above account represents only a small sample of the many interesting results proved in this book. The book will certainly provide very absorbing to everyone interested in incentive compatibility of public decision-making processes.
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- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Bilateral contracts
- Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
- Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- A group decision device: Its Pareto-like optimality
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Efficiency in partnerships
- A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
- Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
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- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
- A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision
- A simple budget-balanced mechanism
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
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- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
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- Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
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- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Concave utility on finite sets
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
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- Destroy to save
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- A market-based approach for enabling inter-area reserve exchange
- Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Mechanism design for policy routing
- Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- A hierarchical view of complex systems
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