Publication:3208356
From MaRDI portal
zbMath0417.90001MaRDI QIDQ3208356
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry R. Green
Publication date: 1979
Nash equilibria; incentives; game theoretic model; dominant strategy; elementary exposition; public decision-making; large economies; Pareto optimal outcomes; Clark-Groves mechanism; incentive compatibility requirements; manipulation by coalitions; satisfactory mechanisms; truthful strategies
91B06: Decision theory
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B14: Social choice
91-01: Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance
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