scientific article

zbMATH Open0417.90001MaRDI QIDQ3208356FDOQ3208356

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jerry Green

Publication date: 1979

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoretic modelincentivesNash equilibriadominant strategyelementary expositionpublic decision-makinglarge economiesPareto optimal outcomesClark-Groves mechanismincentive compatibility requirementsmanipulation by coalitionssatisfactory mechanismstruthful strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
• On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
• Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
• Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing
• Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
• Destroy to save
• Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• Fair Groves mechanisms
• A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
• Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• A control-theoretic view on incentives
• Mechanism design for policy routing
• Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
• Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Mixed bundling auctions
• Efficiency in partnerships
• Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
• Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
• A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
• On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof
• Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
• On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games
• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
• Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• Economic juries and public project provision
• Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
• Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Concave utility on finite sets
• Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
• House allocation with transfers
• Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
• Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
• A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
• Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
• On robust constitution design
• Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
• A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
• Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
• Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
• Core-selecting package auctions
• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
• Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
• Incentive-compatible interdomain routing
• A simple implementation of efficient allocations
• Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks
• Class shares and economies of scope
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
• Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• An optional permit system for global pollution control
• Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
• Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
• Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
• On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
• Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
• An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
• Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
• Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
• Efficiency and Budget Balance
• Algorithmic Mechanism Design for Collaboration in Large-Scale Transportation Networks
• Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division
• Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
• Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
• Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
• Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
• An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
• Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
• Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
• Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders

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