scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233
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Publication:3208356
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Fair Groves mechanisms
- Bilateral contracts
- Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
- Pivot mechanisms as a link between probability and preference revelation
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- A group decision device: Its Pareto-like optimality
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Efficiency in partnerships
- A new characterization of the Groves-Clarke mechanism
- Coalitionally dominant strategy mechanisms with limited public information
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Regulation of a risk averse firm
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
- Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good.
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
- A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision
- A simple budget-balanced mechanism
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- On the balancedness of multiple machine sequencing games
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Concave utility on finite sets
- Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
- Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
- Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
- A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- Destroy to save
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- A market-based approach for enabling inter-area reserve exchange
- Binary public decisions and undominated mechanisms
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism
- Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
- Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Mixed bundling auctions
- Mechanism design for policy routing
- Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Core-selecting package auctions
- Misrepresentation-proof strategies in poly-agent systems
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- On the efficiency of hurdle rate-based coordination mechanisms
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- A hierarchical view of complex systems
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