Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:834856
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.06.007zbMATH Open1168.91367OpenAlexW2027062276MaRDI QIDQ834856FDOQ834856
Authors: Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer 
Publication date: 27 August 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.06.007
Recommendations
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
- Fair payments for efficient allocations in public sector combinatorial auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966906
- Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
- Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
- Vickrey auctions for irregular distributions
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentives in Teams
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
- Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids
- Competitive auctions and digital goods
- Competitive auctions
- Fair imposition
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Derandomization of auctions
Cited In (41)
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction
- Destroy to save
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
- Groves mechanisms and communication externalities
- Expressive markets for donating to charities
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
- Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments
- Competitive VCG redistribution mechanism for public project problem
- Greater flexibility in mechanism design through altruism
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Efficient money burning in general domains
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
- On a modification of the VCG mechanism and its optimality
- Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals
- Explicitly simple near-tie auctions
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads
- Undominated mechanisms and the provision of a pure public good in two agent economies
- Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution
- Redistribution of VCG payments in public project problems
- A simple budget-balanced mechanism
- Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism
This page was built for publication: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q834856)
