Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_35zbMath1406.91191arXiv1306.4022OpenAlexW105934940MaRDI QIDQ2937777

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Balasubramanian Sivan

Publication date: 12 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.4022

zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionBulow-Klempererirregular distributionsprior-independent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Making the Most of Your Samples ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue

Cites Work

• The effectiveness of English auctions.
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Auction Design

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