Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
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Publication:2173417
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.007zbMath1437.91127arXiv1704.05027OpenAlexW3014585802MaRDI QIDQ2173417
Alexandros Psomas, Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.05027
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (3)
Selling two identical objects ⋮ Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
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