Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations

DOI10.3982/TE1517zbMath1395.91533OpenAlexW2240464601MaRDI QIDQ4586023

Sergiu Hart, Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1517

zbMATH Keywords

differentiabilityrandomizationrevenue maximizationnonmonotonicitymultidimensional types

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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