Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4586023
Recommendations
- Revenue maximization with nonexcludable goods
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum
- Revenue maximization in Stackelberg pricing games: beyond the combinatorial setting
- Revenue maximization in Stackelberg pricing games: beyond the combinatorial setting
- Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods
- On revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
- On revenue-maximizing mechanisms assuming convex costs
- Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
Cited in
(42)- A note on optimal allocation mechanisms
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
- A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue
- Selling two identical objects
- On symmetries in multi-dimensional mechanism design
- Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
- Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
- Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
- Matching with partners and projects
- Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods
- Endogenous budget constraints
- Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Bayesian auctions with efficient queries
- Optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem with two-dimensional types
- Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition
- Revenue maximization for selling multiple correlated items
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
- A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements
- Large-scale bundle-size pricing: a theoretical analysis
- On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
- Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
- Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
- Selling two complementary goods
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- Auction design for bidders with ex post ROI constraints
- Separation in distributionally robust monopolist problem
- Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
- Intertemporal bundling
- Robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple goods
- Undominated monopoly regulation
- Mind the revenue gap: on the performance of approximation mechanisms under budget constraints
- Multidimensional screening with precise seller information
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Membership mechanism
- Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
- On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
This page was built for publication: Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4586023)
