Selling two goods optimally

DOI10.1016/j.ic.2018.02.016zbMath1396.91247arXiv1510.03399OpenAlexW2791906826MaRDI QIDQ1641015

Elias Koutsoupias, Yiannis Giannakopoulos

Publication date: 14 June 2018

Published in: Information and Computation, Automata, Languages, and Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.03399

zbMATH Keywords

dualitymechanism designrevenue maximizationoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Generalized Permutahedra and Optimal Auctions ⋮ Selling two goods optimally ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents ⋮ Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations ⋮ On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting ⋮ A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders ⋮ Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations ⋮ A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions

Cites Work

• Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
• Graphs and matching theorems
• The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
• Matching theory
• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Selling two goods optimally
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• Bounding the optimal revenue of selling multiple goods
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
• Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributions
• Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Correlated Items
• Optimal Auction Design
• Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
• The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

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