A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
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Publication:5133980
DOI10.1145/3398745zbMath1493.91027arXiv1405.6146OpenAlexW3036875494MaRDI QIDQ5133980
Moshe Babaioff, S. Matthew Weinberg, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
Publication date: 11 November 2020
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.6146
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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