The optimality of upgrade pricing

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_3MaRDI QIDQ2152102zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt, Alex Smolin

Publication date 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.10323

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationstrong dualitymechanism designupgrade pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Recommendations

• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Non-linear pricing by convex duality
• On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist
• Monopoly pricing

Cites work

• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Nonlinear pricing with finite information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
• Ottimizzazione Combinatoria
• Selling two identical objects
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• When is pure bundling optimal?

Cited in

(3)

• Optimal Pricing and Introduction Timing of Technology Upgrades in Subscription-Based Services
• An Upgrading Algorithm With Optimal Power Law
• Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

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