The optimality of upgrade pricing

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_3OpenAlexW4206159577MaRDI QIDQ2152102FDOQ2152102

Authors: Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Andreas Haupt, Alex Smolin 

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.10323

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationstrong dualitymechanism designupgrade pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ottimizzazione Combinatoria
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• Selling two identical objects
• When Is Pure Bundling Optimal?
• Nonlinear pricing with finite information

Cited In (2)

• An Upgrading Algorithm With Optimal Power Law
• Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

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