Nonlinear pricing with finite information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.004zbMath1479.91133OpenAlexW3193411298MaRDI QIDQ2667239

Dirk Bergemann, Jinkun Zhang, Edmund Yeh

Publication date: 24 November 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1981.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

nonlinear pricingmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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