scientific article
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Publication:3624052
zbMath1165.91376arXiv1110.2733MaRDI QIDQ3624052
Noam Nisan, Liad Blumrosen, I. R. Segal'
Publication date: 28 April 2009
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.2733
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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