The communication cost of selfishness

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.015MaRDI QIDQ840676zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ronald Fadel, I. R. Segal'

Publication date 14 September 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.015

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designBayesian incentive compatibilitycommunication complexityex post incentive compatibilityinformation setssequential and simultaneous communication protocols

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A Mathematical Theory of Communication
• An efficient dynamic mechanism
• Communication Complexity
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Game theory
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• Incentive compatibility and informational requirements
• Microeconomic theory
• On Partitioning a Sample With Binary-Type Questions in Lieu of Collecting Observations
• The communication cost of selfishness
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• The private value single item bisection auction
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(21)

• To reveal or not to reveal: privacy preferences and economic frictions
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
• Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations
• Mechanism design with a restricted action space
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
• Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity
• Menu mechanisms
• Communication in economic mechanisms
• The communication burden of payment determination
• Communication and efficiency in auctions
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Asking questions
• Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
• Eliciting truthful reports with partial signals in repeated games
• Sampling and optimal preference elicitation in simple mechanisms
• The communication cost of selfishness
• An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly

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